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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Jul
Memorandum of Conversation

DATE:

August 3, 1950

SUBJECT:

POLICY PLANNING
STAFF

PARTICIPANTS:

AUG 3 1950

British Ambassador
Mr. Harriman
Senator Millikin
Mr. Dulles
Department of State

COPIES TO:

Secretary Acheson
Mr. Jossup
Mr. Rusk
Mr. Nitze ✓
Mr. Wickerson

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDS/MR

REVIEWED BY *JS*

DATE

10 AUG 1950

RDS ☐ or XDS ☐ EXT. DATE

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Conversation took place at Mr. Dulles' house after dinner on August 2nd.

The Ambassador said that he had been reading my San Francisco address and was particularly interested in what I said about the seating, at the Security Council of a representative of the Chinese Communists. He said he was deeply concerned because he felt that his government's desire for this was fundamental and would not be changed and he could see the beginning of what might develop into a serious breach between our two countries. He said that his government was not primarily influenced by commercial considerations or by a desire to save Hongkong, but rather by a feeling that sooner or later there would be a breach between the Chinese and Stalin communists and that it was necessary to play for that as the only hope of combatting Soviet Communism in Asia and the Pacific. He felt therefore that when the matter came to issue in the Security Council his government would feel that it had no choice but to vote to seat the communists. He recognized that this would create bad feeling here because of the popular emotional strain caused by the desperate nature of the fighting in Korea the burden of which, on land, the United States was assuming virtually alone.

Mr. Dulles said that even if our principle hope was a breach between the Chinese and the Stalin communists he doubted whether that would be particularly influenced by our conduct. The breach between the Tito and Stalin communists had occurred despite the fact that we had treated the two as one. Internal jealousies and

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rivalries and diverse needs brought these things to pass rather than our plotting them from the outside. Mr. Dulles also referred to the Ambassador's reference to the breach as something that would come "sooner or later" and indicated his fear that it would come so much later that it would not help to save the position in Asia and the Pacific as against what was now a combined thrust in which the Chinese Communists were openly accepting, and urging on others, subversion to the Soviet Communist Party. As regards seating in the United Nations, Mr. Dulles thought that would be disastrous if it came at a time when the United Nations was functioning not as a "town meeting of the world" but as an action body, actually prosecuting war in Korea, a war in which many Americans were dying and all were sacrificing, and where the Chinese Communists were giving aid and comfort to those who were both our enemies and enemies of the United Nations. To bring them into the Security Council under those circumstances would, Mr. Dulles thought, involve a violent reaction on the part of the American people against the United Nations and, if the action came about through a United Kingdom vote, there would be strong feeling also against the United Kingdom.

The Ambassador said he realized all that and it disturbed him greatly because he did not see much likelihood of his government's changing its position. He said he would like to discuss the matter further within the next day or so.

WJ:Dulles:12

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